When an agent acts for you
Identity and authentication standards can establish which registered agent or workload is presenting a credential. Authorization standards govern which resources and operations it may reach. Neither fully expresses the harder thing: the business commitments it is allowed to create on your behalf. The commitment it makes, the limit it stays inside, the human who stands behind it. There are emerging proposals for action-specific agent authorization, but no adopted framework yet governs the full organizational lifecycle of agent-created commitments end to end: from delegated authority, through action-specific limits and execution, to proof of the resulting commitment. This is a first draft of one.
An agent should never hold authority that lacks an accountable owner, visible limits and provable authorization.
What exists, and what does not
Substantial pieces of this ground are already covered. NIST's agent identity and authorization work asks how agents prove authority and act on behalf of people. The UNCITRAL model law on automated contracting addresses attribution when software forms contracts. For the high-risk systems it covers, the EU AI Act requires human-oversight measures that let people understand a system's limits, watch for anomalies, intervene, override or reverse its outputs, and stop it where needed. OWASP's agent security guidance covers scoped tools, approvals, audit trails and circuit breakers. The closest emerging technical proposal is a February 2026 IETF Internet-Draft on agent operation authorization, which defines action-specific authorization tokens, cryptographically bound user consent, signed agent-to-agent delegation chains and runtime enforcement. It is a work in progress, not an adopted standard, and it stops short of the organizational lifecycle this reference covers: who may delegate business authority, how aggregate commitment limits are governed, how contractual obligations constrain it, and how the resulting exposure is reconciled and overseen.
What we could not find is one framework that assembles those pieces into a complete, testable authority lifecycle for agent-created commitments: an agent that can approve a payment, sign a clause or promise a service level is exercising authority, not just access, and the mechanisms for governing that are scattered across standards work, engineering blogs, cloud consoles and legal playbooks. This reference assembles them into one model: six layers, each answering one question a responsible owner would ask. Three of them draw a line worth stating: intent defines purpose, policy translates applicable rules, and commitment controls bound the external effects the agent may create.
The six layers
Before it runs, an agent declares, in signed, machine-readable form, what it is deployed to do. That declared intent is translated into reviewed, enforceable action policies, and every consequential action is checked against them. Anything outside them stops.
- A signed statement of purpose and scope, registered before the agent goes live.
- Each action is validated against those policies the instant before it executes.
- The system watches for drift: an agent slowly doing things its purpose never covered.
Evidence to keep: the signed intent declaration, each boundary check decision, and the drift reports.
Every commitment an agent makes traces to an accountable organizational authority and, where required, an authorized human decision: who or what delegated it, the scope, the expiry. Nothing is self-granted.
- Commitments are checked against the authorizing person's real limits, in money, quantity and scope, before they happen.
- High-stakes actions hit a hard gate the agent cannot self-approve or wait out.
- The human's approval is bound to the exact action, same amount, same recipient, same parameters, so approval for one thing cannot become another.
- Where conflicts or material risk exist, approval must satisfy defined independence and segregation-of-duties rules.
- Delegated authority is revocable on the spot, not merely at expiry: a role change, a compromise or a policy change pulls it back, and revocation reaches every grant derived from it.
- Authority may pass through chains of agents. Each hop may only reduce or narrow the authority it inherits; it cannot create new authority. Chain depth is bounded, and the full chain from principal to acting agent is provable.
- The approved action is the executed action: approvals expire quickly, replays are rejected, and the resulting commitment, counterparty response and final state are reconciled against what was approved.
Evidence to keep: the delegation record behind every commitment, each limit evaluation, the approval bound to the exact action it authorized, revocation events and where they propagated, the complete delegation chain, approval expiry and replay decisions, and the execution receipt reconciled against the approved action.
The rules an agent works under are written down, versioned and machine-readable, rather than knowledge that lives in someone's head.
- Applicable obligations from real contracts are identified, reviewed and translated into enforceable constraints where feasible.
- Conflicting rules are detected before they reach the agent.
- Every data access is evaluated against the policy attached to that data, before it is granted.
Evidence to keep: the versioned policy register, the obligations extracted from each contract, and every policy decision at the moment of access.
An agent that can buy, sign or promise operates inside hard boundaries set by humans before it ever engages.
- A firm ceiling it cannot exceed: a hard block, never a soft warning.
- A review gate that holds execution until the human checks are complete.
- A negotiation envelope, agreed in advance, that it cannot step outside of.
- Limits that are cumulative as well as per action: totals per session, per counterparty and per period, aggregated across every agent drawing on the same authority, so a hundred small actions cannot do what one large action could not.
- Capacity is reserved atomically before execution, so parallel agents cannot each consume the same remaining authority.
Evidence to keep: every attempt against a ceiling, every hold at a review gate, the negotiation envelope each engagement ran under, and the running cumulative picture: reserved and completed commitments, totals per counterparty and period, across every agent sharing the authority.
Authority is watched continuously, not granted once and forgotten: a live view of what every agent is allowed to do, and what it is actually doing.
- A running ledger of each agent's commitment authority.
- Drift detection against the declared purpose and policies.
- A defined response path the moment something crosses a line.
Evidence to keep: the authority ledger over time, each drift alert, and what was done about it.
Every authority decision leaves a tamper-evident trail, and the whole picture rolls up into one signed record a board or an auditor can verify.
- A tamper-evident, access-controlled and independently verifiable record of approvals, commitments and overrides.
- A counterparty-facing proof of authority: the party on the other side of a commitment can verify the agent was authorized for it, without being exposed to internal policy.
- Reporting a board and senior leaders can rely on.
- A signed attestation backed by independently verifiable control evidence.
Evidence to keep: this layer is itself the evidence, the tamper-evident trail and the signed attestation that rolls it up.
How this fails in practice
These layers are not theoretical. Each maps to a known failure mode:
In the July 2026 evaluation incidents, the only thing between a capable model and real victims was an instruction in its prompt. It did not hold. A limit an agent can talk itself past is a wish, not a control. That is why the delegation and commitment layers demand hard gates enforced outside the agent.
A human approves one thing; by execution time the amount, the recipient or the parameters have changed. Without binding the approval to the exact action, sign-off becomes a blank check. This is a recurring gap in the deployments we have reviewed, although that observation is not a systematic industry measurement.
Agents accumulate scopes the way old service accounts accumulate permissions: quietly. Without a live ledger and drift detection, the honest answer to "what can this agent commit us to today?" is "we would have to check." By then it is an incident question, not a governance one.
Where to start
If none of this exists in your organization yet, three moves create the skeleton:
- Write the ledger. One page per agent: what it may commit, up to what limit, delegated by whom, expiring when. If writing it is hard, that is the finding.
- Set one hard ceiling. Pick the agent with the most commitment power and give it a technically enforced limit it cannot exceed. A hard block, never a warning.
- Bind one approval. For your highest-stakes gated action, bind the human approval to the exact action object. Everything else builds on that pattern.
The edges of this proposal
Early reviewers pushed hard on what this model does not cover. They were right to, and the boundaries deserve to be explicit:
- Legal validity. This model governs internal authority. Whether a commitment legally binds the organization, in which jurisdiction, in what form, with what disclosure to the counterparty, is a legal layer this reference does not claim to settle.
- Remedies after execution. The model is strongest before an action and thinner after it. Cancel, unwind, dispute and notification mechanics for agent-created commitments need their own treatment; our controls classify reversibility and can suspend an agent, but a full remedy layer is future work.
- Degraded operation. When the policy engine, the approval service or the ledger is down, the safe answer is not always to stop everything. Fail-closed and emergency behavior should be predefined per action risk.
- The enforcement layer's own integrity. Everything here assumes the control plane is trustworthy. Proving that, from workload identity to injection resistance to tamper-evident logs, is what the rest of the corpus's security and agentic controls exist for; this reference does not restate them.
Alternative decompositions are welcome too. A reviewer proposed splitting authority definition, enforcement and assurance more cleanly than our six layers do. If a sharper cut of the same ground emerges, we will adopt it. Being corrected in public is the point.
Use it, test it, break it
Every layer above is backed by concrete, testable controls in the authority domain: 56 controls, each stating what must be true, the evidence that shows it, and the machine tests that check it, published as machine-readable data under CC BY 4.0.
Where this stands
This proposal comes directly out of our analysis of what actually grounds AI assurance. That analysis found agent authority to be the thinnest-grounded area we cover: it rests on the fewest strong sources of any area, and while individual controls have solid anchors, borrowed from established approval and audit practice, no single standard grounds agent-created authority and commitments end to end. Not because we mapped it carelessly, but because that standard does not yet exist. Where we usually cite, here we propose.
This proposal is synthesized from the Apeiris authority controls, which are open, machine-readable and free to use under CC BY 4.0. It describes what to guarantee, never which product to buy.